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Background:Mentalizing, themental capacity to understand oneself and others in terms
of mental states, has been found to be reduced in several mental disorders. Some studies
have suggested that eating disorders (EDs) may also be associated with impairments in
mentalizing. The aim of this work is to investigate the possible presence of mentalizing
subtypes in a sample of patients with EDs.
Method: A sample of patients with eating disorders (N = 157) completed a battery
of measures assessing mentalization and related variables, including the Reflective
Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ), the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Strategies (DERS),
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). Clinicians rated patients in relation to imbalances
in different dimensions of mentalization to prementalizing modes and attachment style
by using the Mentalization Imbalances Scale, the Modes of Mentalization Scale (MMS),
and the Adult Attachment Questionnaire. A latent profile analysis was conducted to test
the possible presence of different subgroups. MANOVA was used to test the possible
differences between the four mentalizing profiles in relation to emotion dysregulation
(DERS), empathy (IRI), and adequate and impairments in mentalizing (MMS and RFQ).
Results: The latent profile analysis suggested the presence of four different profiles in
relation to impairments in the dimensions of mentalization: (1) affective/self/automatic
imbalances, (2) external imbalance, (3) cognitive/self/automatic imbalances, and (4)
cognitive/other/automatic imbalances. Patients belonging to profile 1 are characterized
by the prevalence of affective mentalization that overwhelms the capacity to reflect on
mental states with an imbalance on the self-dimension; profile 2 patients are excessively
focused on the external cues of mentalization; profile 3 patients are characterized
by an over-involvement on the cognitive and self-facets of mentalization, with an
impairment in adopting the other mind perspective; and profile 4 patients have similar
impairments compared to profile 3 patients but with an excessive focus on others
and deficits in self-reflection. These profiles were heterogeneous in terms of EDs
represented in each group and presented significant differences on various variables
such as attachment style, emotion dysregulation, empathy, interpersonal reactivity, and
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reflective function. This study represents, so far, the first work that confirms the presence
of different mentalizing patterns in ED patients.
Conclusions: ED patients can be classified in relation to impairments in different
dimensions of mentalization above and beyond ED diagnosis.
Keywords: mentalization, eating disorders, reflective functioning, anorexia, bulimia
INTRODUCTION
(Tasca, 2019) in recent years, the concept of mentalization
has attracted increasing research interest in the field of eating
disorders (EDs), and several studies have reported findings
of mentalizing difficulties in adults with EDs (Russell et al.,
2009; Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2010; Oldershaw et al., 2011;
Dejong et al., 2013; Morris et al., 2014). Moreover, some
authors have suggested that ED symptomatology may be related
to specific, peculiar difficulties in mentalization (Skårderud,
2007). Mentalization can be defined as “the mental process
by which an individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the
actions of himself and others as meaningful on the basis of
intentional mental states such as personal desires, needs, feelings,
beliefs, and reasons” (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004, p. 21) and
is considered as a multifaceted ability related to eight different
dimensions: automatic mentalization, controlled mentalization,
mentalization toward self, mentalization toward others,
cognitive mentalization, affective mentalization, internally
focused mentalization, and externally focused mentalization
(Luyten et al., 2012). The automatic dimension refers to
the implicit and unconscious processes of recognizing and
understanding inner mental states in oneself and others, while
controlled mentalization refers to a conscious and deliberate
action, such as when we talk about our feelings or motivations.
The self and others dimensions are related to the object of
mentalizing. Mentalization can, in fact, refer to the capacity to
reflect on our own inner experiences, such as when we describe
our emotions and/or feelings in a particular situation (the
“mentalizing toward self ” dimension), but it can also be focused
on other people. The cognitive dimension of mentalization refers
to the activity of understanding the representational nature of
thoughts, while affective mentalization is a particular type of
affective regulation that is composed of three different domains
(Jurist, 2005): identifying, processing, and expressing affective
mental states. Mentalization can be focused either on the external
manifestations of mental states (e.g., prosody, body posture,
face expressions, etc.) or on the inner world of individuals (e.g.,
beliefs, desires, etc.).
The literature on EDs and mentalization has theoretically
suggested the presence of specific failures of mentalization in
these patients (Skårderud, 2007). From an empirical standpoint,
different authors have enlightened the presence of mentalizing
problems in patients with ED (see, e.g., Aloi et al., 2017; Maxwell
et al., 2017; Simonsen et al., 2020). A previous study on 25
patients with EDs (n = 13 with anorexia-restricting type, n = 7
with anorexia binge/purge type, and n= 5 with bulimia nervosa)
has suggested how these patients are characterized by lower
levels of mentalization regarding the self and higher levels of
alexithymia, usingmore emotional suppression and less cognitive
reappraisal than controls (Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2018). Several
studies have examined the mentalizing ability with the Reflective
Functioning (RF) Scale (Fonagy et al., 1998) and have shown
that patients with anorexia nervosa (AN) exhibit a less developed
ability to mentalize compared to individuals without EDs (Ward
et al., 2001; Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2018). The ability to
understand mental states in these patients seems to be related to
emotional mental states and not to un-emotional mental states
(Brockmeyer et al., 2016). In a previous study, Aloi et al. (2017)
found that patients with binge eating disorder showed a deficit in
recognizing their own emotions, with higher levels of alexithymia
and problematics in interoceptive awareness.
Moreover, patients with AN have problems in relation to
the ability to self mentalize and present imbalances on the
cognitive dimension of mentalization as expressed by a high
level of alexithymia compared with patients with bulimia nervosa
(BN) and controls (Corcos et al., 2000; Speranza et al., 2005).
Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis has reported that emotion
recognition in others is impaired both in AN and BN patients.
However, more severe deficits were found in acute AN, while BN
was associated with only a small impairment (Bora and Köse,
2016).
A recent review and meta-analysis has suggested that
patients with ED may show specific problematics in different
dimensions of mentalization, with more severe difficulties on
the self dimension of mentalization (Simonsen et al., 2020).
The results of this analysis are consistent with the study of
Adenzato et al. (2012), who found that patients with AN scored
significantly lower on mentalization ability about themselves
than healthy controls but exhibited a mentalization ability about
others comparable with the healthy subjects. Aloi et al. (2017)
likewise found that patients with binge eating disorders scored
significantly lower on mentalization ability about themselves
than healthy subjects but showed a comparable mentalizing
ability about others.
In another study on a sample of 53 patients with BN with
borderline features compared to a healthy control group, the
authors found that patients with BN had significantly different
scores compared to healthy controls on all tests of mentalizing.
More specifically, BN patients showed significantly lower levels
on RFQc (excessive certainty) and significantly higher levels on
RFQu (excessive uncertainty), compared to healthy controls, on
the Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ, see measures
section), with moderate to large between-group effect sizes.
These differences were related both to bulimic symptoms and to
borderline personality disorder (BPD) features, suggesting that
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poor mentalizing may be a significant factor in BN patients and
should be addressed in treatment, regardless of the presence of
BPD features (Sacchetti et al., 2019). On the contrary, other
studies have failed to find mentalizing impairments in BN
(Pedersen et al., 2012), and some studies have shown that bulimic
patients tend to have average or even high mentalizing abilities
(Kenyon et al., 2012; Pedersen et al., 2015).
A study on 70 patients with BN has shown a bi-
modal distribution of RF in these patients: The authors have
hypothesized that these patients may be divided in two groups,
one being more defended against mental states (with low RF
scores) and one being more focused on the effort to understand
others’ behaviors (with higher RF scores) (Pedersen et al., 2012).
On the whole, the abovementioned studies seem to suggest that
ED patients show a specific pattern of problematics in emotion
recognition and in mentalizing toward self, with some patients
showing even high levels of mentalization.
The results of the studies mentioned so far seem to suggest
that ED patients have problematics in mentalization but that
these problematics are quite heterogeneous or not coherent
across different studies. This partial incoherence in the results
could be explained in relation to the different measures used
in the various studies: for example, the RFS (Fonagy et al.,
1998) represents a multidimensional measure of mentalization
which provides only a global score ranging from −1 to +9
on the basis of a semi-structured interview focused on the
patients’ attachment relationships. This method has been used
in previous studies (see, e.g., Taubner et al., 2013); however,
a single global score does not provide information on the
specific failures of mentalization and thus fails to encompass
all the nuanced facets of mentalization which have been
developed and studied over time. Therefore, while the RFS
may not be so adequate at distinguishing good mentalization
and hypermentalization, the RFQ seems to be more sensitive
to these differences. Moreover, in the aforementioned studies,
the rating of the different dimensions of mentalization (self,
other, cognitive, affective, internal, external, implicit, explicit)
or of the prementalizing modalities of thought described
in the theoretical literature (pseudomentalization, concrete
comprehension, teleological thought, good mentalization) was
accomplished by using indirect methods (e.g., by using measures
for the assessment of alexithymia to rate the self and affective
dimension of mentalization) and not with ad hocmeasures.
During the past few decades, the vast majority of research
on mental illness has focused on investigating manifestations
and correlates of categorical psychiatric diagnoses as defined by
the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). During
recent years, however, concerns have been raised that categorical
diagnoses are heterogeneous (i.e., subsuming clinically relevant
subgroups of patients; Lilienfeld and Treadway, 2016). In the
case of EDs, for example, several reviews have demonstrated
that symptom presentations can vary to a relatively large
extent within the diagnostic categories (Wildes and Marcus,
2015). Additionally, it has been shown that individuals cross
over and shift between ED diagnoses over time, and some
authors suggested that there may be common denominators,
such as emotion dysregulation (Eddy et al., 2008; Lavender
et al., 2015) or mentalization (Vann et al., 2014). The attempt
to classify ED patients above and beyond symptoms and
categorical diagnosis is not new, but these attempts focused
generally on personality styles (Westen and Harnden-Fischer,
2001) or according to their evolution within the framework of
care (Montourcy et al., 2018) rather than on specific factors
that could be implicated in the etiology and maintenance
of the disorders: e.g., previous research on the relationship
between EDs and personality disorders has identified three
personality subtypes in patients with EDs (Westen and
Harnden-Fischer, 2001): a dysregulated/undercontrolled
pattern, characterized by emotional dysregulation and
impulsivity; a constricted/overcontrolled pattern, characterized
by emotional inhibition, cognitively sparse representations
of the self and others, and interpersonal avoidance; and
a high-functioning/perfectionistic pattern, characterized
by psychological strengths alloyed with perfectionism and
negative affectivity.
The first aim of this work was to investigate the characteristics
of mentalization in a sample of patients with EDs in order to
identify different groups characterized by specific impairments
in mentalization, independent from the ED symptoms. The
second aim of this work was to investigate the relationship
between these empirically derived mentalizing profiles and
clinical, personality, and ED variables. In doing so, we focused
on specific variables which have been previously found to be
compromised in EDs and which are theoretically and empirically
related to mentalization, i.e., personality pathology, attachment
style, emotion dysregulation, cognitive and affective empathy
interpersonal abilities, and reflective function. These variables
are differently related to specific facets of mentalization which,
in previous studies, were found to be compromised in patients
with EDs, more specifically the recognition of emotions and
the understanding of others and own’s mental states. This is an
exploratory study which aimed at filling the literature gap on the
presence of specificmentalizing profiles in ED patients. Given the
exploratory nature of this study and since the available literature
on the topic does not allow for specific conclusions and points out
the necessity to have further studies before being able to identify
specificmentalizing problematics in ED patients (Simonsen et al.,
2020), no specific hypotheses on the profiles were made.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sampling Procedure
From the rosters of the major societies of psychodynamic
and cognitive–behavioral psychotherapy and from centers that
specialized in the treatment of eating disorders, we contacted 700
psychotherapists and asked for their willingness to participate
in the study. We requested that they select a patient who
was at least 18 years old, had had no psychotic disorder or
psychotic symptoms for at least the last 6 months, had seen the
therapist for a minimum of eight sessions and a maximum of 18
months, and had an ED diagnosis. Following the same procedure
adopted in similar studies (Betan et al., 2005; Colli et al., 2014),
we asked clinicians to rate each randomly ordered criterion
for each of the DSM-5 ED diagnoses (American Psychiatric
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Association, 2013) as present or absent. This procedure provided
both a categorical diagnosis (by applying DSM-5 cutoffs) and a
dimensional measure (number of criteria met for each disorder).
Tominimize selection biases, we directed the clinicians to consult
their calendars to select the last patient they had seen during the
previous week who met the study criteria. To minimize rater-
dependent biases, each clinician was allowed to describe only one
patient. We contacted 700 clinicians, of whom 157 returned their
measures, for an overall response rate of 22.5%. The clinicians
received no remuneration. The final sample is composed of
157 therapeutic dyads. The present study was approved by the
Institution Review Board (Ethics Committee) of the “Carlo Bo”
University of Urbino (Italy).
Patients
The sample was composed of 157 Caucasian patients with ED,
treated in psychotherapy. One hundred forty-nine (94.9 %) were
female and eight (5.1%) were male (mean age = 30.88; SD =
11.95; min. = 18; max. = 65). The patients were diagnosed with
different EDs, more specifically: AN (n = 64, 41.4%; of which 44
with AN restricting type and 20 with AN binge purge type), BN
(n = 41, 26.3%), binge eating disorder (BED) (n = 27, 16.2%),
other specified feeding or eating disorder (n = 13, 8.4%), and
unspecified feeding or eating disorder (n = 12, 7.7%). Sixty-
nine patients (44%) had at least one previous hospitalization.
Seventeen patients (10.8%) had attempted suicide at least once,
and 33 were reported with self-harming behaviors (21%). Eighty-
nine (57.8%) were, by the time of the assessment, undergoing
a pharmacotherapy. Fifty-one patients also had a personality
disorder (PD) diagnosis according to the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), alone or in comorbidity, and
fifty-seven patients had sub-threshold personality problems. The
average length of treatment at the moment of the evaluation was
10.31 months (SD= 12.13; min.= 3; max.= 70).
Therapists
The sample was composed of 157 Caucasian therapists, of
which 116 (73.9%) were female and 41 (26.1%) were male
(mean age = 43.21; SD = 8.61; min. = 30; max. = 65). Four
theoretical and clinical approaches were represented in this
sample: psychodynamic (n = 61), systemic (n = 33), integrative
(n = 30), cognitive (n = 19), and other approaches (e.g.,
humanistic, bioenergetic, interpersonal; n = 14). The clinicians
had an average of 15.22 years of previous clinical experience
as psychotherapists (SD = 8.07; min. = 2; max. = 35). Thirty-
five therapists (22.3%) were seeing the selected patients in public
health services, 31 (19.8%) in hospitals, 30 (19.1%) a private
setting, 22 (14%) in residential structures, and 35 in different
settings (schools, universities, forensic, etc.).
Measures/Instruments
The therapists were asked to fill out different measures. The
clinician report measures included:
• Mentalization Imbalances Scale (MIS) (Gagliardini et al.,
2018): The MIS represents a clinician report assessment
measure of mentalizing imbalances in adult patients. It is
composed of 22 items rated on a Likert scale from 0
(“absolutely not descriptive”) to 5 (“absolutely descriptive”)
and represents an assessment measure of mentalizing
imbalances on the basis of six subscales: imbalance toward
self (four items), indicating an excessive focus on patient’s
own mind which prevents from the possibility to connect
with others’ thoughts and feelings and perspectives; imbalance
toward others (three items), indicating an excessive focus on
other peoples’ mental states rather than the patient’s own;
affective imbalance (four items), indicating a hyper-activation
of affects and emotions not adequately balanced by cognition;
cognitive imbalance (five items), indicating an excessive focus
on the cognitive facets of mentalization (which can lead to
intellectualizing) that is not balanced by the affective facets of
experience; automatic imbalance (three items), indicating the
ability to automatically and implicitly recognize mental states,
which, however, is not paired by the capacity to explicitly and
declaratively reflect on them, even when actively solicited by
others (e.g., a therapist); and external imbalance (three items),
indicating those cases in which a person excessively relies on
the external cues of mental states (i.e., facial expressions, body
postures, etc.) without reflecting on inner mental states (e.g.,
beliefs, desires, thoughts, emotions). TheMIS has been used in
previous studies (Carrera et al., 2018; Gagliardini et al., 2018,
2020) in which it has shown a good reliability. In the present
study, the scale has shown sufficient to good psychometric
properties (Cronbach, 1951), with alphas of 0.84 (imbalance
on the self), 0.80 (cognitive imbalance), 0.79 (automatic
imbalance), 0.78 (affective imbalance), 0.61 (imbalance on the
others), and 0.60 (external imbalance).
• Modes of Mentalization Scale (MMS) (Gagliardini and Colli,
2019): The MMS is a clinician report assessment measure of
the modes of mentalization on five different subscales: (1)
excessive certainty (six items), indicating an over-activation of
mentalization, in which patients show an excessive certainty
about mental states and think that they can provide all
of the answers regarding other people’s inner worlds; (2)
concrete thinking (six items), indicating the tendency to
interpret reality on the basis of heuristics and prejudices
and/or on the basis of physical or invariant constraints,
to use common sense explanations or clichés to explain
emotions, and to adopt bizarre explanations of behaviors; (3)
good mentalization (five items), indicating a good capacity
to recognize and coherently describe mental states, united
with a curious stance toward the same and an awareness
that people can experience contrasting feelings and desires;
(4) teleological thought (three items), indicating a tendency
to rely more on the physical manifestations of mental states
(i.e., actions) rather than interpreting the world in terms of
beliefs, desires, or thoughts, to focus more on what people do
(and not on what they think or feel), and to be more focused
on the physical, practical, resolution of a problem rather
than on the meanings related to the situation; (5) intrusive
pseudomentalization (four items), related to a more malign
form of hyper- or pseudo-mentalization, indicating a tendency
to intrude on and manipulate other people’s life, in which the
reflections of one’s inner world do not seem to be genuine.
The factor structure and reliability of the scale was explored
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in previous studies (Gagliardini and Colli, 2019; Gagliardini
et al., 2020) that enlightened good psychometric properties,
with alphas ranging from 0.91 to 0.67 (Gagliardini and
Colli, 2019). In the present study, alphas were ranging from
sufficient to good (Cronbach, 1951) and were, respectively,
0.88 (excessive certainty), 0.86 (good mentalization), 0.83
(concrete comprehension), 0.75 (teleological thought), and
0.71 (intrusive pseudomentalization).
• Eating disorders: Following the same procedure adopted in
similar studies (Betan et al., 2005; Colli et al., 2014), we
asked the clinicians to rate each randomly ordered criterion
for each of the DSM-5 ED diagnoses (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) as present or absent. This procedure
provided both a categorical diagnosis (by applying DSM-5
cutoffs) and a dimensional measure (number of criteria met
for each disorder).
• Clinical questionnaire: The clinical questionnaire was
constructed ad hoc for clinicians in order to obtain general
information about them, their patients, and the therapies they
used. Clinicians provided basic demographic and professional
data, including discipline (psychiatry or psychology),
theoretical approach, hours of work, and gender as well
as patients’ ages and other concomitant therapies (e.g.,
pharmacotherapy). Clinicians provided additional data on the
therapies, such as length of treatment and number of sessions
per week. To provide a more comprehensive assessment of
patients’ problems that may be connected to EDs and/or to
mentalizing deficits, the respondents were also asked to use
the items of the clinical questionnaire to rate the presence
or the absence of a list of clinical problems (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013), such as dissociative symptoms,
self-harming behaviors, and obsessive symptoms.
• Personality disorders checklist: Following the same procedure
adopted in similar studies (Betan et al., 2005; Colli et al., 2014),
we asked the clinicians to rate each randomly ordered criterion
for each of the DSM-5 PD diagnoses (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) as present or absent. This procedure
provided both a categorical diagnosis (by applying DSM-5
cutoffs) and a dimensional measure (number of criteria met
for each disorder).
• Adult Attachment Questionnaire (AAQ) (Westen andNakash,
2006): The AAQ is a 37-item clinician reportmeasure designed
to assess patients’ attachment styles. It is based on a seven-
point Likert scale and codifies patients’ attachment styles into
four different dimensions: secure (“tends to expect that s/he
can rely on the availability and responsiveness of the people
who are important to him/her”), insecure-dismissing (“tends
to minimize or dismiss the importance of close relationship
with others”), insecure-preoccupied [“seems to be mired in, or
preoccupied with, past attachment relationships (e.g., seems
still to be fighting old battles with mother, father, etc.)”] and
incoherent/disorganized [“tends to use vague, meaningless, or
empty words when describing interpersonal events (e.g., may
insert nonsense words such as ‘dadadada’ into sentences or
use psychobabble such as ‘she has a lot of material around
that issue’)”]. The AAQ has been used in previous studies
on Italian samples, in which it showed good psychometric
properties (see, e.g., Gagliardini and Colli, 2019). In the
present study, alphas were, respectively,0.85 (secure),0.83
(insecure-preoccupied),0.80 (disorganized), and.69 (insecure-
dismissing).
The patients’ self-report measures included:
• Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Strategies (DERS) (Gratz
and Roemer, 2004): The DERS is a self-report measure filled
out by patients and is composed of six subscales for the
assessment of emotional regulation: (1) lack of acceptance
of the emotional responses (“non-acceptance”), (2) difficulty
in distracting from emotions and engaging in goal-oriented
behaviors (“goals”), (3) limited access to emotion regulation
strategies (“strategies”), (4) lack of control when experiencing
intense emotions (“impulse”), (5) difficulties in recognizing
emotions (“clarity”), and (6) limited awareness of emotion
(“awareness”) (Weinberg and Klonsky, 2009; Neumann et al.,
2010; Perez et al., 2012; Ritschel et al., 2015). In this study,
we adopted the Italian version of the scale, which has been
validated by Sighinolfi et al. (2010). In the present study, the
scale has shown good psychometric properties (Cronbach,
1951), with alphas ranging from 0.91 to 0.83.
• Basic Empathy Scale (BES) (Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006;
Albiero et al., 2009): The BES is composed of 20 items
assessed on a Likert scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5
(“strongly agree”). The scale provides a measure for empathic
concern on two dimensions: affective empathy and cognitive
empathy. The scale has shown a good internal consistency and
reliability in relation to different measures for the assessment
of related constructs (Carré et al., 2013). Empathy, as assessed
with the BES, correlates with intelligence, extroversion, and
neuroticism. The Italian validation of the BES (Albiero et al.,
2009) has also indicated a positive correlation between the BES
and interpersonal reactivity as assessed with the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980); moreover, higher empathy
scores are related to prosocial behaviors. In this study the scale
has shown good psychometric properties, with alphas of 0.82
(affective empathy) and of 0.83 (cognitive empathy).
• Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980; Albiero
et al., 2006): The IRI represents a measure for the assessment
of empathic responsiveness and is composed of 28 items rated
by patients on a five-point Likert scale. It is composed of
four subscales: (1) fantasy, which assesses the tendency to
transpose one’s self imaginatively into the feelings and actions
of fictitious characters; (2) empathic concern, covering feelings
for others such as sympathy and concern for their welfare;
(3) perspective taking, which describes one’s tendency to
spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others;
and (4) personal distress, which is related to feelings of distress,
unpleasantness, and anxiety resulting from tense interpersonal
situations. The factor structure of the scale has been confirmed
in different studies (Chrysikou and Thompson, 2016). In this
study, the scale has shown good psychometric properties, with
alphas of 0.83 (perspective taking), 0.75 (personal distress),
0.72 (empathic concern), and 0.71 (fantasy).
• Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ) (Fonagy et al.,
2016; Morandotti et al., 2018): The RFQ is a self-report
for the assessment of mentalization. The RFQ assesses
mentalization or reflective function by asking the patient
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for the MIS, MMS, AAQ, DERS, BES, RFQ, and
IRI (N = 157).
MIS M SD
Cognitive imbalance 2.32 1.08
External imbalance 2.24 1.06
Affective imbalance 2.59 1.28
Imbalance toward others 2.40 1.16
Imbalance toward self 2.28 1.22
Automatic imbalance 2.28 1.22
MMS
Excessive certainty 1.59 1.05
Concrete comprehension 1.76 1.01
Good mentalization 2.80 1.10
Teleological thought 2.50 1.19
Intrusive pseudomentalization 1.25 1.00
AAQ
Secure 3.14 1.01
Insecure dismissing 2.41 0.92










Affective empathy 3.68 0.69






Empathic concern 3.79 0.69
Perspective taking 3.30 0.73
Personal distress 3.15 0.70
MIS, Mentalization Imbalances Scale; MMS, Modes of Mentalization Scale; AAQ,
Adult Attachment Questionnaire; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale;
BES, Basic Empathy Scale; IRI, Interpersonal Reactivity Index; RFQ, Reflective
Functioning Questionnaire.
to answer eight items on a Likert scale from 1 (“strongly
disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Scores are then recoded
and collapsed into two different subscales: RFQ_certainty
(RFQ_c), which reflects an excessive certainty about mental
states, and RFQ_uncertainty (RFQ_u), which reflects an
excessive uncertainty about self and others’ mental states. The
factor structure of the scale has been tested on a sample of
patients with eating disorders and borderline PD (Fonagy
et al., 2016). In this study, the scale has shown sufficient
psychometric properties, with alphas of 0.65 (RFQ_u) and 0.70
(RFQ_c), respectively.
TABLE 2 | Fit statistics of the latent profile analysis (k = 1:5).
Number of profiles (k) BLRT AIC BIC Entropy
1 / 2,503.95 2,598.29
2 81.48* 2,470.96 2,640.40 0.61
3 77.13* 2,434.71 2,631.25 0.80
4 51.20 2,378.34 2,622.97 0.86
5 46.95 2,450.65 2,646.38 0.92
*p < 0.05.
BLRT, bootstrapped likelihood ratio test; AIC, Akaike Information Criterion; BIC, Bayesian
Information Criterion.
Statistical Analysis
To empirically discriminate the presence of specific profiles in
relation to mentalizing impairments in patients with Eds, we
performed a latent profile analysis (LPA) according to their
scores on the six subscales of the Mentalization Imbalances Scale.
Previously to this analysis, outliers and univariate normality
were checked. The following criteria were used for deciding
the best number of profiles to be retained: non-significant p-
values for the bootstrapped likelihood ratio test (BLRT), lower
values of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and of Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), and entropy value higher than 0.80
(Wang et al., 2017). MANOVA and ANOVA were used to detect
differences among the empirically determined profiles in the
self-report measures. Zero-order correlations were calculated to
test associations between study variables and profile posterior
probabilities. Chi-square test was used to investigate differences
in the distribution of ED diagnosis among the profiles. LPA was
conducted through the R package “TidyLPA”; all other analyses




Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for MIS, MMS, BES,
DERS, IRI, and RFQ in the whole sample (N = 157). Preliminary
analyses showed that none of the MIS subscales contained
outliers. Further data inspection showed no violations of
normality for all the subscales (standardized |skewness| and
|kurtosis|<1.0), with the exception of the BES cognitive empathy
scale (kurtosis = 2.32). Table 1 shows the means and standard
deviations for MIS, MMS, BES, DERS, IRI, and RFQ in the whole
sample (N = 157).
Latent Profile Analysis
To identify the optimal number of profiles, models with one
through five profiles (k = 1–5) were compared. Fit statistics,
including the BLRT, AIC, BIC, and entropy values are presented
in Table 2. An analytic hierarchy process, based on these fit
indices (Akogul and Erisoglu, 2017), suggested that the best
solution was the model with four profiles. The comparisons
between overall mean for each scale score of mentalization
and within-profile mean were used to assign labels to the four
empirically derived profiles (Table 3). Figure 1 presents the
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TABLE 3 | Comparison between overall mean and within-profile means.
Overall mean “E” profile (N = 26) “CAO” profile (N = 24) “ASA” profile (N = 87) “CAS” profile (N = 20)
Mean difference t Mean difference t Mean difference t Mean difference t
MIS cognitive 2.32 −1.30 −8.35* 0.62 3.78* 0.01 0.06 0.90 5.00*
MIS extern 2.24 0.86 3.89* 0.08 0.43 −0.09 −0.89 −0.84 −4.54*
MIS affective 2.59 −0.92 4.63* −0.29 −1.44* 0.63 5.36 −1.21 −6.26*
MIS other 2.16 −0.55 −5.42* 0.87 7.20* 0.09 1.05 −0.74 −4.27*
MIS self 2.40 −1.78 −24.62* 0.29 1.91 0.28 2.76* 0.73 3.57*
MIS auto 2.28 −1.70 −17.53* 0.43 2.17* 0.27 2.42* 0.49 2.45*
*p < 0.05.
MIS, Mentalization Imbalances Scale; cognitive, cognitive imbalance; extern, external imbalance; affective, affective imbalance; other, imbalance toward others; self, imbalance toward
self; auto, automatic imbalance; E, external; CAO, cognitive automatic other; CSA, cognitive self-automatic; ASA, affective self-automatic. MIS, Mentalization Imbalances Scale; E,
External; CAO, Cognitive Automatic Other; CSA, Cognitive Automatic Self; ASA, Affective Self-Automatic.
FIGURE 1 | Standardized group averages on MIS subscales for a four-profile solution. MIS, Mentalization Imbalances Scale; cog, cognitive imbalance; ext, external
imbalance; aff, affective imbalance; oth, imbalance toward others; self, imbalance toward self; auto, automatic imbalance; E, external; CAO, cognitive automatic other;
CSA, self-cognitive automatic; ASA, affective self-automatic.
standardized group averages on MIS subscales for a four-profile
solution.
The proportions of subjects within each profile showed
that more than half of patients (55%) had higher-than-average
score on affective, self, and auto imbalances; in this group,
patients’ emotions overcome his/her capacity to think, and
they may feel that emotions are out of control (ASA). The
second most numerous profile included 17% of patients and
was focused on external imbalance (E); in this profile, the
patient tends to focus more than sample’s average on others’
facial expressions and/or non-verbal cues when communicating
with other; he/she may easily be influenced by other peoples’
emotions. The last two profiles shared high scores on cognitive
and automatic scales, but their imbalances were oriented toward
different objects being focused to understand their own (CSA;
12%) or other people’s (COA; 15%) mental states more on
a cognitive level than on an affective one and throughout
implicit and uncontrolled processes. Table 4 presents a narrative
prototype based on the most descriptive MIS items for each
profile.
The four profiles identified were heterogeneous in terms of ED
distribution (see Table 5). We found no statistical difference in
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TABLE 4 | Narrative prototypes based on the most descriptive MIS items for each profile.
Profile 1 “E”
The patient seems to preverbally intuit people’s feelings or thoughts (3.29) and is excessively focused on others’ facial expressions and/or non-verbal cues when
communicating with others (including the therapist) (3.06). The patient seems to have a “sixth sense” about other people’s (including the therapist) mental states (2.77).
Moreover, the patients’ emotions seem to overcome their capacity to think (2.69), and they may easily be influenced by other peoples’ emotions (2.64). The patient
feels that emotions are out of control (2.33) and seems to be unconsciously attuned to other people’s emotions (2.23).
Profile 2 “CAO”
The patient seems to understand people more on a cognitive level than on an affective one (3.60), and when speaking, he/she seems to be detached from emotions
(3.17). The patient often seems to lack words to describe feelings (3.11), and they may easily be influenced by other peoples’ emotions (3.11). Moreover, the patient
seems to inhibit the expression of (positive and/or negative) emotions (3.06) and seems to be unconsciously attuned to other people’s emotions (2.97).
Profile 3 “ASA”
The patients’ emotions overcome his/her capacity to think (3.78), and they may feel that emotions are out of control (3.69). In turn, the patients may act impulsively
(3.52) and may misinterpret other people’s behavior (3.45). The patients can easily be influenced by others’ emotions (3.34) but may have problems at understanding
others’ perspective when interpreting their behaviors (3.33). The patients’ emotions can change rapidly (3.29).
Profile 4 “CSA”
The patient seems to understand people more on a cognitive level than on an affective one (3.60), and when speaking, he/she seems to be detached from emotions
(3.17). The patient often seems to lack words to describe feelings (3.11) and fails to assume others’ perspective when interpreting behaviors (3.11). Moreover, the
patient seems to inhibit the expression of (positive and/or negative) emotions (3.06). The patient fails to consider points of view that differ from his/her own (2.97) and
may misunderstand other people’s behaviors (2.94).
MIS, Mentalization Imbalances Scale; E, external; CAO, cognitive automatic other; CSA, cognitive self-automatic; ASA, affective self-automatic.
relation to eating disorders’ diagnoses among the profiles, X2 (df
= 15)= 24.10, p= 0.06.
Profiles and Other Variables
In order to give a deeper description and characterization of
profiles and testing their clinical utility, we were interested
in comparing the four profiles in relation to different facets
of mentalization such as prementalizing modes (Modes of
Mentalization Scale), certainty/uncertainty about mental states
(RFQ), and other variables related with mentalization such
as attachment (AAQ), emotional regulation (DERS), empathy
(BES), and interpersonal sensitivity.
Multivariate ANOVA was routinely used to compare
the profiles in relation to other study variables (see
Supplementary Table 1). However, because of the small
sample size (N < 30) of three out of the four profiles that would
have reduced the power of the study, we chose to treat the data
as continuous variables. In fact, in the LPA, the assignment of
the participants to the classes is based on their posterior modal
probabilities; in other terms, each subject has a membership
probability value for each of the k profiles identified. Therefore,
we calculate the correlations between the posterior probabilities
for each profile and the above-mentioned study variables
(Table 6).
In relation to the MMS, higher probabilities of being
in ASA profile result in being significantly associated with
several prementalizing modes (concrete, teleological, and
excessive certainty); the CAO profile results in being associated
with intrusive pseudomentalization. Higher probabilities
of belonging to the CSA and the ASA profile results in being
negatively associated with goodmentalization. Conversely higher
membership or assignment probabilities in E profile result in
being associated in a positive way with good mentalization and
negatively with all prementalizing modes. Moreover, higher
membership in ASA group was associated with higher RFQ
uncertainty and lower RFQ certainty.
In relation to emotion regulation, higher membership in ASA
profile results in being associated with several dimensions of
DERS, confirming that this profile was composed of patients
with greater difficulties in emotion regulation. Conversely,
the two profiles characterized by imbalances on the cognitive
dimension (CAO and CAS) higher membership result in being
negatively associated with the non-acceptance and impulse DERS
scale, respectively.
In relation to empathy (IRI), the perspective taking dimension
results in being negatively associated with higher membership
in CAO profile but positively with the external profile, while
the empathic concern resulted higher when the probability
of being in ASA profile was higher and lower for higher
membership in CAS profile. Finally, the fantasy scale results in
being associated with the E profile and negatively with the CAO.
Concerning attachment styles, secure attachment results in being
positively associated with higher membership in E profile and
negatively associated with the other profiles, while preoccupied
and disorganized attachment was positively associated with
higher membership in ASA profile.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate the possible
presence of different groups of mentalization impairments in
adult patients with EDs. Our results suggest the presence of
four different profiles in relation to elevation in mentalization
imbalances (MIS scores): external (E), cognitive-other-automatic
(CAO), affective-self-automatic (ASA), and cognitive-self-
automatic (CAS). The four profiles were heterogeneous not
only in terms of mentalizing impairments but also in terms of
different clinical aspects. This result seems to confirm findings
of previous studies which have enlightened how patients with
EDs may be more clearly identified by using different variables
other than eating problematics and symptoms, variables which
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TABLE 5 | ED and PD distributions among the four profiles.
“E” profile “CAO” profile “ASA” profile “CSA” profile
(N = 26) (N = 24) (N = 87) (N = 20)
n % n % n % n %
AN (restrictive) 5 19.2 13 56.5 18 21.2 8 40.0
AN
(binge/purge)
2 7.7 2 8.7 13 15.3 3 15.0
BN 9 34.6 1 4.3 26 30.6 4 20.0
BED 7 26.9 2 8.7 3 15.3 3 15.0
Other specified
ED
1 3.8 4 17.4 7 8.2 1 5.0
Not specified
ED
2 7.7 1 4.3 8 9.4 1 5.0
PD 2 1.3 10 7.2 34 22 8 5.1
AN, anorexia nervosa; BN, bulimia nervosa; BED, binge eating disorder; ED, eating
disorder; PD, personality disorders.
are more closely related to personality or mental functioning
and less related to weight attention on the body and attitude
toward food.
The profile we labeled ASA (with higher imbalances in
affective, self-oriented, and automatic facets) seems to collect
ED patients characterized by greater problematics in emotional
regulation that have difficulties in accepting and trusting their
own feelings, as also confirmed by their low certainty about
their own mental states. Patients of the ASA profile, rather
than adopting high-functioning or controlled reflection, tend to
shift to prementalizing modes of thought such as teleological
and concrete comprehension. In other words, these patients
tend to interpret reality in terms of physical reality rather than
considering complex mental states. Moreover, the affective focus
of these patients probably allow them to have “other oriented”
feelings and sympathy, but this is not associated with an ability in
perspective taking. These patients showed greater problematics
in relation to attachment, especially in relation to preoccupied
and disorganized attachment. Finally, into the ASA profile, it
falls more than half of the patients in our sample. This data
can partially be explained by the fact that this seems to be the
profile that is characterized by the more compelling problematics
in mentalization and our patients have shown high levels of
comorbidity with PDs. Many of the patients of the ASA profile,
in fact, have a comorbid PD. A different explanation could be
related to the fact that 75 of the patients of our sample have
problematics in the control of impulses and have a diagnosis of
AN binge/purge type, BN, and BED, and these problematics may
be related to the affective and automatic facets of mentalization.
This data is also in line with previous works which have
enlightened the presence of problematics in emotion regulation
in ED patients (Monell et al., 2018; Prefit et al., 2019).
Two profiles had results characterized by a greater focus on the
cognitive facets of mentalization but differed on the basis of the
focus on the self (CSA) or the others (CAO). It is worth of note
that anorexia was the prevalent diagnosis in both of these two
profiles. This seems to support the picture of a “cold” anorexic
patient, cognitively rigid and affectively constricted (Schmidt and
TABLE 6 | Correlations between mentalization profiles and prementalizing modes,
attachment, emotion regulation, and empathy.
“E” “CAO” “ASA” “CSA”
profile profile profile profile
MMS
Excessive certainty −0.271*** 0.019 0.195* −0.002
Concrete comprehension −0.443*** 0.157 0.271*** −0.064
Good mentalization 0.542*** −0.114 −0.218** 0.173*
Teleological thought −0.445*** 0.111 0.212** 0.073
Intrusive pseudomentalization −0.359*** 0.206** 0.157 −0.042
AAQ
Secure 0.581*** −0.118* −0.182* −0.192*
Insecure dismissing −0.397*** 0.093 0.073 0.224**
Insecure preoccupied −0.229** −0.021 0.243** −0.076
Disorganized −0.339*** 0.076 0.254*** −0.071
DERS
Non–acceptance −0.048 −0.229** 0.236** −0.058
Goals −0.057 −0.150 0.159 −0.016
Strategies −0.161 −0.061 0.255** −0.126
Impulse −0.054 −0.046 0.294*** −0.319***
Clarity −0.117 0.025 0.127 −0.077
Awareness −0.169* 0.018 0.173* −0.082
RFQ
Uncertainty −0.135 −0.091 0.250** −0.118
Certainty 0.091 0.042 −0.174* 0.108
BES
Affective empathy 0.093 −0.004 0.036 −0.155
Cognitive empathy 0.177* −0.109 −0.032 −0.041
IRI
Fantasy 0.171* −0.137** 0.108 −0.108
Empathic concern 0.091 −0.071 0.173* −0.280***
Perspective taking 0.194* −0.203* −0.023 0.023
Personal distress −0.064 0.035 0.134 −0.158
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
MIS, Mentalization Imbalances Scale; AAQ, Adult Attachment Questionnaire; MMS,
Modes of Mentalization Scale; DERS, Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; RFQ,
Reflective Functioning Questionnaire; BES, Basic Empathy Scale; IRI, Interpersonal
Reactivity Index.
Treasure, 2006). However, these imbalances were also present in
bulimic or binger individuals, suggesting that poor mentalization
should be considered as a transdiagnostic impairment. Regarding
the interpersonal area of functioning, it is interesting to note
that the focus on the self and on the cognitive dimension of
the CSA patients seems to reduce their capacity to feel what
the others are experiencing (a reduced empathic concern), and
this is also confirmed by the significant association with the
dismissing attachment style. Moreover, the CAO patients’ profile
results in being negatively associated with perspective taking: this
result seems to confirm that, in these patients, the difficulty at
mentalizing and the subsequent incapacity to fully differentiate
self and others do not allow for them to feel the authentic
capacity to connect with others empathetically. In line with
this consideration, this profile was associated with intrusive
preseudomentalization, in which the opaqueness of the other
mind is not respected.
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A separate discussion is related to the results on the external
profile, which is characterized by subjects that excessively rely
on the external signs of mental states (i.e., facial expressions,
body postures, etc.) (Luyten and Fonagy, 2015). In our study,
this profile results in being associated with secure attachment,
good mentalization, and perspective taking: in other words,
this profile seems to be associated with several signs of high
functioning in patients. Bateman and Fonagy (2016) has recently
recalled that, in many studies, poor facial emotion recognition
and communication, increased facial avoidance, and reduced
understanding of mental states were all associated with eating
disorder pathology. Moreover, there is empirical evidence of
impaired recognition of facial emotions in AN in comparison to
healthy individuals (Kucharska-Pietura et al., 2004). Therefore,
the preference of this group of patients on external cues could
indicate a higher functioning in this profile. However, from our
point of view, this does not mean that the patients in this group
are totally free of anymentalizing impairment, but they somehow
seem to compensate them. These patients could be excessively
focused on the external facets of mentalization, perhaps in order
to vigilate on the external environment and control it. This result
may explain the contradictory results on the relationship between
BN and mentalization: It is possible that there are different
mentalizing styles in bulimic patients, with one group showing
higher mentalizing functioning and another group being more
dysregulated and impaired in terms of mentalization. Therefore,
this result seems to confirm the presence of a group of patients
with ED that is characterized both by a focus on the effort to
understand others’ behaviors and high RF scores (Pedersen et al.,
2012).
A different explanation is related to the validity of the external
scale of the MIS, which probably fails to distinguish between a
pathological and excessive external focus on the external facets
of mentalization and the capacity to understand others’ mental
states on the basis of external cues such as face expression. In
a previous study (Gagliardini et al., 2018), the authors have
suggested that two of the items of this subscale [i.e., “Patient
seems to preverbally intuit people’s feelings or thoughts” and
“The patient seems to have a “sixth sense” about other people’s
(including the therapist) mental states”] could be interpreted by
clinicians as positive capacities and therefore could indicate the
adaptive capacity of patients to connect and comprehend on a
procedural basis others’ mental states. Moreover, this is the only
MIS scale which has not an opposite dimension of the pole (e.g.,
cognitive vs. affective). While it is quite easy to think about an
affective imbalance as associated to difficulties in the cognitive
facets of mentalization and vice versa, the same is not true for
the internal/external dimension. From a phenomenological and
clinical perspective, in fact, we may conceptualize an imbalance
on the external facet of mentalization (e.g., a patient who
sees the therapist frowning and therefore hypothesizes that
he or she is bored); it is more difficult to hypothesize that
the patients overestimate the internal facets of mentalization
without considering the external cues of mentalizing, and this
is more true for cognitive processes. For example, whereas
the differentiation internal/external seems easily applicable to
emotions, which have both external expressions and internal
feeling qualities, this does not seem to be the case with
cognitions, which do not have bodily expressions to any
similar degree (Liljenfors and Lundh, 2015). In the future,
it will be necessary to address the issue of the validity of
this subscale.
The four-profile solution found in our study seems to be
consistent with the findings of previous studies that tried to
categorize eating disorders in different personality subtypes
(Westen and Harnden-Fischer, 2001; Thompson-Brenner and
Westen, 2005): the ASA profile, characterized first of all
by the affective imbalance and an impairment in controlled
mentalization, seems close to the dysregulated/undercontrolled
pattern described in literature; the COA and CSA profiles that are
both characterized by an excessive focus on the cognitive facets
of experience and a form of detachment from emotions seem to
echo the constricted personality subtype, and finally the external
profile seems similar to the high-functioning personality group.
More generally, an interesting result of this study regards the
distribution of mentalization imbalances between the different
diagnoses of ED. This result can lead to various speculations:
one could explore the existence of ED subtypes with different
mentalization characteristics/difficulties; mentalization problem
heterogeneity and transdiagnostic occurrence may also mark
different etiological pathways for eating psychopathology. In line
with this, it would be interesting to explore how mentalization
impairments in ED patients are associated with the outcome of
the therapy.
This study has some limitations. First and foremost, the
distribution of EDs in our sample is heterogeneous but not
balanced (41% of our patents were diagnosed with AN, restrictive
or binge/purge type). Future studies should involve more
balanced samples in which each ED is equally represented.
The ED diagnoses provided in this study rely on the clinical
judgement of the therapists included in the study, of whom were
asked to rate each DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association,
2013) ED criterion as present or absent. This procedure, which
allows for us to have both dimensional and categorical diagnoses
for each ED, has a major limitation of not being based on a
structured interview, which would have increased the accuracy
of the ED diagnoses. Moreover, there is a high comorbidity of
PDs in the sample, and this could impact on the generalizability
of our results: for example, we could not exclude that the
profiles we found were largely influenced by the patients’
personality problematics. However, it is important to observe
that comorbidity with personality disorders is quite frequent
in the case of EDs and that the comorbidity we observed in
our sample is similar to the ones described in literature (Godt,
2008; Martinussen et al., 2017). Similarly, several patients were
under pharmacological therapy, and this could affect their mental
functioning and the profiles that we observed. The Cronbach
alpha of some scales was below 0.70, and so the reliability of some
results could not be sufficient.
Finally, the age range of the sample is quite wide (min.
= 18, max. = 68), and so is the chronicity of the disorder.
Unfortunately, our sample size did not allow for us to perform
different latent profile analyses in different age groups; however,
future studies should consider this possibility in order to provide
more detailed information on the possible presence of different
clusters related to the chronicity of the disease.
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Despite these limitations and the exploratory nature of our
study taken together, these results seem to suggest that a
comprehensive assessment of patients with EDs should also be
focused on the patients’ mentalizing impairments since patients
with the same ED could be characterized by opposite patterns
of mentalizing impairments: for example, patients with AN
were characterized by imbalances on both the cognitive and the
affective dimensions of mentalization. From our point of view,
this could also change the focus of clinicians’ interventions, which
should be in one case the affective facets of mentalization and
on the other the cognitive dimension, by promoting emotion
regulation strategies. The four profiles that have been identified
in this study must be further investigated, and future studies
should also investigate the treatment outcome of therapeutic
interventions of these profiles in order to see if different profiles
are associated with different outcomes.
CONCLUSIONS
ED patients can be classified in relation to impairments in
different dimensions of mentalization above and beyond ED
diagnosis. This preliminary investigation suggests to clinicians
to take in consideration mentalization from a multidimensional
approach when treating ED patients.
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